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Comment on Arm’s-Length Intimacy:  
Employment as Relationship 
Scott Baker  
In Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship,1 Marion 
Crain makes the following set of observations: People make reliance 
investments in marriage.
2
 To some extent, family law protects such 
investments. Some states, for example, provide for equitable division 
of property upon divorce.
3
 Similarly, employees make reliance 
investments in their employer. Yet employment law—specifically 
through the doctrine of employment-at-will—does not protect 
employee reliance.
4
 Since work and family share similar investment 
features, Crain argues that the law should make employment law 
more like family law.
5
 Specifically, employment law might provide 
additional rights upon termination: such as hefty notice requirements, 
the ability of discharged employees in at-will states to sue for 
emotional distress damages, and even potentially granting employees 
the right to use firm-owned trade secrets developed during the course 
of their employment.
6
  
Crain’s Article is interesting and provocative. By locating 
similarities, it forces the reader to identify the ways in which work 
and family differ. In so doing, the paper is a welcome contribution to 
the literature. Despite these strengths, I think the Article has some 
weaknesses, which limit its broader applicability. 
 
 
 
Professor of Law; Professor of Economics (courtesy), Washington University in St. 
Louis. 
 1. Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 163 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 169. 
 3. For a review of the various kinds of termination rights available, see IRA MARK 
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 325–53 (5th ed. 2010). 
 4. Crain, supra note 1, at 164–67. 
 5. Id. at 168–69. 
 6. Id. at 203–10. 
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The Article rests on contestable (and contested) assumptions 
about how labor markets work. Crain assumes that employers have 
all the bargaining power.
7
 Since employees face exploitation in 
Crain’s framework, the natural questions posed are (1) what remedies 
can be applied to mitigate the problems of employees discharged 
without cause, and (2) why aren’t these remedies applied in 
employment law when they are available in family law? But why 
assume that the employer exploits the relationship-specific 
investment by the employee rather than the employee exploiting the 
relationship-specific investment by the employer? After all, 
employers invest in workers. When an employee quits, any 
investment by the employer in that employee is lost. The employer 
must locate a replacement worker and start all over.  
Symmetric application of Crain’s proposal means that the 
employer should be protected from an employee quitting without 
cause. Maybe the law should force the employee to provide the 
employer funds for locating his replacement. My hunch is that Crain 
believes employers can protect themselves and, as such, don’t need 
help from the law. By contrast, employees, Crain assumes, are the 
powerless party in the relationship. This conclusion flows directly 
from—and therefore depends on the validity of—the assumption 
about the distribution of bargaining power throughout the span of the 
work relationship, or, more specifically, the assumption that workers 
are the vulnerable party at the beginning, in the middle, and at the 
end of the relationship.
8
  
In addition to contestable assumptions, why does Crain stop at 
employment law? The obvious next step under Crain’s reasoning is to 
develop a general theory of relationship-specific investment recovery 
across the board. Imagine a son who takes care of his aging father. 
He gives up his career goals and provides medical attention and 
companionship. On his death bed, the father decides to cut the son 
out of the will, thinking that the son would simply waste his 
inheritance on foolish pursuits. The logic of Crain’s proposal carries 
over. Maybe the father shouldn’t be allowed to cut the son out of the 
 
 7. See id. at 206 (―Why shouldn’t property law protect the more vulnerable party (the 
worker) who has invested in a relationship when the more powerful party ends it?‖).  
 8. Id. at 199 n.161.  
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will without sufficient prior notice; maybe the son should be able to 
sue the estate for his ―wasted‖ relationship-specific investment.  
As a second example, take a person who volunteers at a church 
every weekend. The children in the community become attached to 
the volunteer’s Sunday school lessons. Suppose that the church 
changes its doctrine in a way the volunteer finds repugnant. 
Extending Crain’s proposal, does the churchgoer have to provide 
notice of his departure or else face legal liability? If not, why not? 
Stated differently, would the world be a better place if every 
relationship-specific investment triggered a robust set of termination 
rights for the party on the other side of the relationship?  
Working through this series of examples provides a clue for why 
mandating robust termination rights in employment law might not be 
a good idea. Robust termination rights create stickier employment 
relationships and higher administrative costs to implement those 
protections. The critical question is whether the benefit in terms of 
protecting the worker’s relationship-specific investment outweighs 
these costs. 
This question is especially salient because courts have already 
rejected much of Crain’s proposal when made via promissory 
estoppel claims by employees.
9
 And there is a good reason for this—
the fear that every termination will generate a lawsuit. The bump in 
liability exposure makes labor relatively more expensive and, as a 
result, means that employers will hire fewer workers.  
In short, Crain’s proposal would provide workers a more robust 
set of mandatory termination protections. It is unclear whether fewer 
workers with a more robust set of protections (including the ability to 
file a grievance over a failure to comply with the newly minted 
termination rights) is a better place than a world where workers have 
a weaker set of protections but more of them are employed.  
I anticipate the objection that any mandatory benefit for workers 
whose cost is not completely transferred to workers through lower 
wages can, in effect, make labor more expensive and, as a result, 
 
 9. Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the 
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2 (1999) (―[A]lmost half of the 299 promissory 
estoppel cases decided on the merits were employment cases, but employees won only six 
times, or 4.23%, of the employment cases.‖). 
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decrease employment. As noted above, the relevant consideration is 
whether the social value of the mandatory benefits outstrips the 
cost.
10
 The answer to that question depends on the extent of the 
excessive relationship-specific investment employees routinely make. 
As to the magnitude of this problem, Crain does not offer any 
empirical evidence. 
Part I of this Comment discusses whether the bargaining power 
assumption Crain uses is justified. Part II makes the slippery slope 
argument, asking whether it makes sense to layer a general theory of 
relationship-specific reliance remedies on top of the current legal 
system. Part III suggests that more choice might be best in both 
family law and employment law. The law might make both sets of 
behavior amenable to dual off-the-shelf alternatives, one of which 
protects reliance investments and one of which does not. That is to 
say, the law might allow parties to select up front the ―reliance‖ 
package of termination rights or the ―at-will‖ package of rights. Even 
with this choice (which already exists in employment law and in 
family law, to some extent, with the growth of covenant marriage), 
the default package will matter because many parties won’t bother to 
opt out. Here I suggest the current asymmetric treatment of 
employment and family law could very well reflect majoritarian 
preferences and, as a result, be the efficient default rule. Part IV 
concludes.  
I. BARGAINING POWER AND HOLD-UPS 
For a long time, economists have thought about investments in 
relationships.
11
 When one party commits resources specifically to a 
relationship, they have more to lose if the relationship terminates. As 
such, the counter-party has an incentive to engage in a hold-up, 
 
 10. Note, in particular, that this is not a statement against mandatory terms as such, but 
rather a question about the benefit of these particular mandatory terms. It is well-known that 
mandatory terms can serve other social values (such as, for instance, principles of anti-
discrimination). Mandatory terms can also be efficient by, for instance, preventing wasteful 
signaling. See Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts 
Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381, 381–83 (1990). 
 11. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE (1995).  
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refusing to continue the relationship unless the investing party pays 
over a higher share of the gains from continuing to trade. Crain 
locates the root of the hold-up problem: relationship-specific 
investment that makes switching partners difficult.
12
 As noted, she 
sees analogous potential for hold-ups in family law and employment 
law.  
Economists, naturally I suppose, focus on the efficiency 
consequences of hold-ups. Fearing exploitation ex post, parties will 
be reluctant to make relationship-specific investments ex ante. The 
literature focuses on mechanisms parties can use to mitigate hold-up 
threats, such as relational contracts and the ex ante allocation of 
property rights.
13
  
Crain discusses situations that are in some ways at odds with the 
economic model. In employment, she sees employees making 
investments without fully understanding that precisely those 
investments facilitate exploitation by the employer.
14
 In marriage, 
Crain focuses attention on one spouse committing to the joint cause, 
giving up their career for the family under the illusion that things will 
work out.
15
 Economists generally see too little relationship-specific 
investment; Crain sees too much.  
The difference in conclusions stems from a difference in 
assumptions. Economists assume forward-looking, rational 
behavior.
16
 Parties anticipate the hold-up threat and react to limit their 
exposure to the threat. Crain sees a more complex calculation, part 
delusion, part healthy optimism, and part hope and wishes.
17
  
That said, Crain’s assertion of excessive reliance and the 
economic theory about underinvestment are not necessarily 
inconsistent. Pauline Kim, for example, finds empirical evidence 
 
 12. See generally Crain, supra note 1, at 164–66. 
 13. On using relational contracts generally, see W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. 
Malcomson, Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment, 57 
ECONOMETRICA 447 (1989). On using property rights, see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property 
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).  
 14. See Crain, supra note 1, at 170–71. 
 15. Id. at 173–74, 189–90. 
 16. On the economist’s use of rationality, see Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of 
Looking at Life, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ 
1992/becker-lecture.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
 17. Crain, supra note 1, at 190–92. 
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suggesting that employees in at-will states believe they can only be 
fired for cause.
18
 Operating under this mistaken belief, it becomes 
rational for employees to invest in the employer. The reason is that 
the employee incorrectly perceives that the law provides some 
protection. The problem is not that employees fail to anticipate the 
hold-up problem, but rather that the decision is made under wrong 
assumptions about the legal consequences when the employer 
engages in such behavior.  
But what if most, if not all, firms do not terminate employees 
without cause, even when they have the option to do so? We can 
hypothesize a number of reasons why this might be true. Arbitrary 
firing might reduce the morale of the other workers in the plant. 
Firing without cause sacrifices any investment the employer made in 
the worker. Firing without cause might make it harder to recruit new 
workers. Firing without cause could provoke litigation under, say, 
Title VII.
19
 And defending such a case is harder without some record 
of subpar performance, as opposed to reliance solely on right to 
discharge at will.
20
  
If relatively few arbitrary and unexpected discharges occur, it 
follows that employees’ perception about protections in at-will states 
is consistent with actual firm practice, even if it is inconsistent with 
the law on the books.  
Simply stated, we do not have any empirical evidence about the 
prevalence of random discharges, discharges unprovoked by 
inadequate performance, downturns in the business cycle, changes of 
ownership, etc. The solution Crain proposes (making employment 
law look more like family law) presupposes some significant set of 
cases where employees rely; this reliance makes them vulnerable; 
and firms exploit this vulnerability. The issue is how often this 
sequence of events happens. One can’t look at litigated cases and 
conclude it happens a lot. The selection bias is too great. Since we 
 
 18. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110–11 (1997). 
 19. A full development of these arguments can be found in RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 306–09 (1995). 
 20. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding that ―an 
employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it 
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Comment on Arm’s-Length Intimacy 219 
 
 
don’t have a way to gauge the extent of the problem, it is hard to 
judge the benefit from deploying legal remedies to solve the problem. 
And, making employment law mirror family law is not costless.  
To see this, do the following thought experiment: Suppose that 
terminating an employee became as difficult as terminating a 
marriage. Divorce is messy, even with the advent of no-fault 
divorce.
21
 Usually, though not always, there are lawyers involved. 
Often the parties dislike each other, making the process even more 
unpleasant.
22
 A fired and jaded employee might file suit for a 
violation of the package of termination rights, even if no violation 
occurred. Wanting to avoid the headache, an employer might refuse 
to terminate anyone or, in the alternative, wait until the worker has 
performed so poorly that a cause-based firing could not be credibly 
challenged. The proposal thus weakens the firing threat, which 
dampens incentives for all employees to perform on the job.  
II. A GENERAL THEORY OF RECOVERY FOR RELATIONSHIP-
SPECIFIC/RELIANCE INVESTMENT  
Reliance in relationships is ubiquitous. Children rely on parents; 
roommates and friends rely on each other; partners in a gay couple 
that is not allowed to marry make investments in their relationship; 
contractual parties deploy resources relying while the terms of the 
deal are still under negotiation; and community leaders learn skills 
that match up with the specific needs of their community, relying on 
the fact that they will continue to work in that community. Less 
seriously, we might say that a store owner who decides to stock a 
particular item to satisfy the needs of a specific customer has made a 
reliance investment, or that an organizer of a dinner party makes a 
reliance investment when he starts dinner, thinking that the guests 
won’t cancel at the last minute.  
 
 21. See Crain, supra note 1, at 167 (stating with respect to marriage law that ―[n]otice and 
waiting periods are standard fare at marital dissolution to ease the transition and encourage 
couples to salvage marital relationships, temporary support and alimony are available to 
dependent spouses, and fault is still relevant in many states‖).  
 22. Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After 
Divorce, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 442 (2008) (―Many divorces, however, are quite 
acrimonious, and the parties often feel angry, betrayed, and vengeful.‖). 
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All the relationships I describe above might be characterized as 
―at-will.‖ One can terminate a friendship without showing cause. A 
community leader can decide to up and leave his community without 
notice. For the most part, before offer and acceptance, either 
contracting party can walk away from a deal without incurring 
liability.
23
 Gay couples can separate without filing for divorce. A 
customer can switch grocers, even if the grocer has stocked items 
solely to satisfy his needs. One is not legally compelled to provide 
notice before ducking out of a dinner party. 
Why treat any of these relationships differently from the way we 
treat marriage? If Crain is right that family law and employment law 
should be treated the same, maybe the legal test should simply be 
whether reliance occurs that allows for hold-ups. If so, the context 
should be irrelevant.  
For two reasons, I think context-based line-drawing is appropriate 
when one considers relationship-specific investment, holdup threats, 
and ex post exploitation. First, layering on a reliance remedy is 
costly. Claims must be processed to sort out fraudulent from 
meritorious claims. Second, being able to end a relationship hassle-
free is a benefit. Imagine, as noted in the introduction, a world where 
every jilted friend could file a lawsuit or where notice was legally 
compelled before one could unexpectedly cancel on a dinner 
invitation.  
I see the objection that my parade of examples is unrealistic. The 
clear response is that we should only allow for reliance-based 
remedies when (1) the reliance is consequential (a big deal), and (2) 
exploitation and hold-ups are common. Crain’s argument is that 
employment and marriage meet those conditions.  
My point is that the context—family or work—is important 
because it is the context that evidences the likely extent of the 
problem. And so, per se rules based on context rather than a general 
reliance-based theory are preferable. If I am right, the question for 
 
 23. Despite the general presumption against pre-contractual liability, several scholars have 
shown conditions under which it might be desirable. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-
Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Richard Craswell, Offer, 
Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an 
Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE 
L.J. 1249 (1996). 
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Crain is whether there exists systematically collected, empirical 
evidence supporting the proposition that the hold-up by employers of 
employees is a big problem.  
III. CHOICE  
Although marriage and employment share commonalities, there 
are differences. At the beginning of the relationship—at least on 
average, I suspect—one is more likely to love a spouse than to love 
an employer. And love might cloud one’s judgment about potential 
hold-up problems. Given that spouses won’t protect themselves ex 
ante, it might make sense for the law to provide protections ex post. 
Many employees, on the other hand, might view their job as a job, a 
place to earn a paycheck. What matters is not that some employees 
―love‖ their job like some spouses ―love‖ their partner. What matters 
is the proportion of people who mistakenly commit specific resources 
to a relationship and, in so doing, expose themselves to possible 
exploitation. If relatively more people make this mistake in marriage 
than in employment (because marriage, on average, involves more 
emotional commitment than employment), family law termination 
protections should be more robust than employment law termination 
protections. Unfortunately, what these relative percentages are is an 
empirical question—and an empirical question that we don’t know 
the answer to. 
Even assuming that marriage and employment are the same, it 
does not necessarily follow that employment law should mimic 
family law. Maybe marriage law should mimic employment law 
instead. Perhaps marriage law should be divorce at-will, termination 
without any waiting periods or court documents or hassle, something 
even administratively easier than no-fault divorce.  
And we might do better. Maybe the law should facilitate to a 
greater extent a range of check-the-box options for employment and 
marriage. In marriage, we might build off the covenant marriage idea. 
At the start of marriage, parties select which bundle of family law 
rights apply on divorce. People seeking to induce lots of relationship-
specific investment could choose the ―reliance-protection‖ package. 
Others could choose the ―at-will‖ package. The reliance-protection 
package might fit couples that planned to privilege one spouse’s 
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career. The at-will package might work better for couples anticipating 
two careers. 
Employment law, of course, already offers a range of alternatives. 
As noted above, Crain’s argument is that employers, where possible, 
select at-will employment, thereby maintaining the option of firing 
without cause. No employer ever selects the ―for cause‖ alternative 
without being forced to do so. This line of reasoning is again based 
on the assumption that, in any employment relationship, employers 
have the bargaining power.
24
 This assumption, at least to me, is not 
self-evident—at the very least it is not self-evident in every sector 
and for every kind of worker. 
For example, in non-union firms, there exists heterogeneity in the 
kinds of health and pension benefits offered. If employers always 
have all the bargaining power, why don’t all firms offer the stingiest 
benefits? Crain’s assumption implies that there should not be any 
differentiation in benefits among firms. If firms have all the 
bargaining power, any firm that offered more generous benefits than 
their competitors could slash the benefits without losing existing or 
potential future workers. The employer who refused to do so would 
face higher costs and presumably have a tougher time surviving in 
the market.  
Yet even with a more robust check the box system, the default 
makes a difference. Scholars recognize defaults matter because many 
parties won’t bother to opt out. And, as is well-known, a majoritarian 
default eliminates the need for most parties to do so, saving on 
contracting costs.
25
 Notably, a majoritarian default might generate 
much the same rules we have now, with family law, on average, 
offering more termination protection than employment law. The 
default choice might weigh (1) the harm from misfiring reliance and 
exploitative hold-ups, (2) the importance of an easy administration of 
termination, and (3) value that flows from reducing frictions or 
stickiness in the relationship. When factor (1) is relatively more 
important than factors (2) and (3), the default should protect the 
 
 24. See Crain, supra note 1, at 165–67. 
 25. Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1603, 1631–32 (2009); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
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reliance. When factors (2) and (3) are relatively more important than 
factor (1), the default should be set at-will. It is unclear, but surely 
possible, that mistakenly placed reliance is more prevalent in 
marriage than in employment. Likewise, given that over a lifetime, 
most people will have many more employers than spouses, reducing 
the administrative cost of termination might tilt the default in 
employment toward at-will absent the violation of some other social 
value. Finally, we might not want employment relationships to be as 
sticky as marriage relationships because of the external benefits that 
flow from the movement of labor between employers. 
In the end, I am not sure how to set the respective default rules for 
marriage and employment. My point is simply this: without more 
information, one cannot conclude that the current asymmetric setup is 
incorrect. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As noted in the introduction, Crain’s paper is interesting. It poses 
a good question. Without some empirical support for the assumptions 
underlying it (that firms have all the bargaining power; that 
employers routinely exploit employee reliance; that the 
administrative cost of granting additional termination rights are small 
relative to the benefit the additional rights will provide, etc.), it is 
hard for me to support a transformation of employment law into 
family law. Nonetheless, choice between different sets of termination 
rights is probably best for family and employment. More interesting, 
I suppose, is that the current defaults, which treat work and family 
differently, might actually be appropriate.  
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